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Abstract
The reach of Federal statutorypreemption of inconsistentstate law
obligations has extended to numerous products liability subject
matters, including most notably tobacco products, agricultural
pesticides, medical devices and automobile air bags. The Supreme
Court decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. countenanced a
broad application of federal preemption when the subject statute
contained an express preemption clause. Eight years later the
Court appearedto back away from Cipollone, and held in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co. that even as to statutes with express
preemption clauses, the simultaneous presence of a savings clause
might trigger a narrow reading of the preemption provision. The
potential effect of Geier upon lower court decisions in liability suits
involving pesticides, medical devices, or even tobacco products,
will necessarily be played out in litigation before lower courts for
years to come.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The significance of federal statutory preemption of inconsistent state tort law obligations was branded on the hindquarters of products liability law in the 1992 Supreme Court
decision of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. I Cipollone's emphasis on textual express preemption was followed by numerous
lower court decisions holding that federal health and safety
rules in product subject categories ranging from pesticides to
1. 501 U.S. 504 (1992).
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prostheses to propellers should be given sway over inconsistent
state common law liability or statutory obligations.
The Cipollone-sparkedromp over the historical federal hesitance to impose federal regulation in areas of health, safety
and welfare traditionally ceded to the individual states was
brought to a pause, if not a halt, by the Supreme Court's 2000
decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. 2 In Geier, an air
bag case, the Court gave new vitality to the application of ordinary preemption principles even in the context of a federal
safety statute that contained an express preemption provision
clause, should such statute also contain a "savings" clause provision essaying to preserve common law damage claims from
any preemptive consequences. The implications of Geier and its
explicit distancing from Cipollone will surely roil the waters of
products liability litigation for years to come.
II.
A.

TYPES OF PREEMPTION

Express preemption

Perhaps the most important emerging issue in modern
products liability law is the role of the federal statutory preemption of private civil suits brought under state statutory or common law. Characteristically, the question of the appropriateness of federal preemption is implicated when such state law
claims for damages or equitable remedies trench upon the same
safety objectives, which Congress has addressed directly, or indirectly through federal statute or administrative regulation.
As discussed below, the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.3 gave new definition to the constitutional doctrine of federal legislative preemption, and provided a
basis for modern application of the tenets of that doctrine in a
range of accident law and regulatory settings.
In general terms, federal safety-related statutes, or regulations pursuant to those statutes, that pertain to a particular
field or subject matter may be deemed to preempt state regulation or common law that would impose design, performance, or
informational requirements upon a seller that are inconsistent
with the federal standard. Federal law may also preempt suits
2. __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000).
3. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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brought under state common law or state codification of common law principles that create the risk that a seller who has
satisfied federal safety-related requirements might nevertheless be found liable in money damages, or subject to equitable
relief, in a products liability suit.4 The primacy of federal law in
such subject areas as Congress may elect to regulate is
grounded in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States "shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and.., any Thing in the Consti5
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
Preemption may be either express or implied, and "is compelled whether Congress's command is explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose." 6 Issues of express preemption are textual, while
questions of implied preemption are contextual. By this it is
meant that the question of whether federal law expressly
preempts inconsistent or additional state common law, statutory or regulatory requirements may be deduced from the explicit language of a federal statute. 7 Implied preemption, in
contrast, must ordinarily be inferred from an evaluation of not
only the language of the statute, which may or may not contain
a preemption clause, but also from an assessment of the overall
statutory objectives. As to the latter, a full understanding of
statutory objectives will frequently be informed by pertinent
4. Where applicable, federal preemption precludes coequally state statutes,
regulations or common law enforcement claims. Cf. Gilbert v. Burlington Indus.,
Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 327-28 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986)(ERISA), referenced with approval in Oglesby v. Delaware & Hudson R.R. Co.,180 F.3d 458 (2d
Cir. 1999) (held: railroad employee personal injury claim against employer and
manufacturer of engineer cab seat impliedly preempted by Locomotive Boiler and
Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § § 20701-20903).
Also, the application of preemption principles to state statutory/regulatory
and common law pursuits alike is explained by the Supreme Court's observation in
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959), that
awards of money damages in suits for civil liability can act as a "potent method of
governing conduct and controlling policy."
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
6. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); See generally Oja v.
Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1997) (held: negligent failure to warn
claim in hip prothesis products liability action is not preempted under 1976 Medical Device Act Amendments). Preemption issues associated with medical devices
are discussed below in § II(H).
7. See generally Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504 (1992), discussed in detail at II(A)
below.
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legislative history and the interpretation of the statute given it
by the regulatory agency charged with its effectuation. 8
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in its interpretation of the Supremacy Clause as applicable to state law preemption "starts with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal
Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."9 Express preemption is properly found "[w]hen Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included
in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that
issue, and when that provision provides a 'reliable indicium of
congressional intent with respect to state authority[.] "'10 In the
words of one court concerning express preemption:
Federal preemption is a relatively simple concept, especially
when Congress has explicitly provided the terms of preemption.
It provides order. Instead of having 50 or more standards with
respect to a given human pursuit, there is one. When a preemptive federal standard is applied evenhandedly, it further provides
both the protection of the federal standard and some leeway to
develop state standards where the federal standard does not
apply."
A party advancing the defense of federal preemption must
overcome an established presumption against federal preemption of state law. Thus any statutory provision forming the ba2
sis of a preemption defense will be narrowly construed,'
consistent with the tenet that state police powers, particularly
state regulations relating to health and safety, should not be

8. Implied preemption of state common law or statutory products liability litigation is discussed in § I(B) below.
9. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
10. Id. at 517.
11. Steele v. Collagen Corp., 54 Cal. App. 4th 1474 (1997) (citations omitted)
(personal injury claims arising from administration of Zyderm).
12. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr., 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996), interpreted in Ryan v.
Brunswick Corp., 557 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Mich. 1997) (federal decision not to require
boat propeller guards found to preempt state law personal injury claims grounded
in argument that propeller guards would have prevented or lessened decedent's
injury).

5
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superseded without a demonstration that such preemption is
13
the "clear and unequivocal intent of Congress."
B.

Implied preemption
i. General implied preemption

Where a federal safety-related statute does not contain language providing expressly for its preemptive effect, and, where
pertinent, the preemptive effect of regulations or standards
promulgated pursuant thereto, the products liability defendant
will attempt to argue that the language of the statute, the context of the federal regulatory interest, and the wishes of the congressional authors, read together, require the conclusion that
inconsistent or additional state law claims or requirements are
impliedly preempted. 14 This subsection and the two to follow
describe briefly the three principal theories underlying the doc15
trine of implied preemption.
Defendant's defense of general implied preemption may
succeed upon a showing that the scope of the safety-related
statute, including a fact-specific appreciation of its comprehen13. Ryan, 557 N.W.2d at 546 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). See
Hillsborough Co. v. Automated Medical Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985).
As stated by the Supreme Court in Medtronic, matters of the citizenry's health
and safety "are primarily and historically matters of local concern[,]" and therefore
"the States traditionally have a great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, comfort and quiet of all persons." Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475.
14. See, e.g., Carter H. Dukes, Comment, Alcohol Manufacturersand the Duty
to Warn: An Analysis of Recent Case Law in Light of the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, 38 EMORY L.J. 1189 (1989) (27 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-210 (West 1988)
expressly preempts claims against alcohol manufacturers for failure to warn, but
neither expressly nor impliedly precludes plaintiffs' cause of action for promotional
and advertising activities).
15. The three analytically distinct types of implied preemption that courts
have recognized are (1) general implied preemption, (2) field preemption, and (3)
conflict preemption. Ordered differently, the factor analysis employed by many
courts in adopting these distinctions were summarized by the Supreme Court in
this way: (1) "Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether may be found
from a 'scheme of federal regulation so persuasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it;"' (2) an act of Congress may
touch a field in which the federal interest is "so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject;" or (3)
because "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." Fidelity Fed. Sav.& Loan
Assoc. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
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siveness and its particularity, taken together with the observations of its congressional authors and its regulatory legal
experts, demonstrates that toleration of inconsistent or additional state common law or statutory requirements would frustrate the purpose of the federal act. 16 As the Supreme Court
has explained, in the absence of language revealing "an explicit
congressional intent to preempt state law," courts examining
the potential that federal law impliedly preempts state statutory or common law claims should consider "whether the federal
statute's 'structure and purpose,' or nonspecific statutory lan17
guage, reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent."
ii.

Field preemption

Even though concepts of federalism preserve a constitutional reluctance to permit federal law to supplant state regulatory prerogative, particularly in matters associated with the
health, safety and welfare of citizens of that state, there are two
additional theories by which a federal safety-related statute
may be deemed to impliedly preempt an additional or inconsistent state claim or requirement. A second means of implied preemption is termed "field preemption." A conclusion that state
statutory or common law remedies are preempted by a federal
statutory initiative may be warranted when examination of the
federal statute and allied regulations permit the conclusion that
in passing the statute and creating the regulatory authority of
the pertinent federal agency or agencies, Congress intended
that federal law and regulation effectively and functionally occupy the safety field that the state law or regulation would purport to enter. Field preemption may be found when Congress or
its administrative delegees have "so thoroughly occupied a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress

left no room for the states to supplement

it."'18

A finding of field preemption of state statutory enforcement
or common law liability claims does not turn upon whether the
federal agency has actually initiated regulation in the pertinent
16. See Phillip Morris, Inc., v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 66-67 (1st Cir. 1997).
17. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1996).
18. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. Compare with Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825 (D. C. Cir. 1994) (held: FDA regulations did not implicitly
preempt state common law claims in Bendectin-related litigation).
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subject matter, but rather upon whether it is empowered to do
so. 19 The Supreme Court so confirmed in Napier v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. 20 in which, interpreting the Locomotive Boiler
Inspection Act, 21 it wrote: "The fact that the [Interstate Commerce] Commission has not seen fit to exercise its authority to
the full extent conferred, has no bearing on the construction of
22
the act delegating the power."
iii. Conflict preemption
Third, additional or inconsistent state safety common law
or statutory obligations or requirements may be deemed to be
impliedly preempted where the obligations or prohibitions imposed by state statute or regulation "actually conflic[t] with federal law," 23 which is to say, in instances in which "compliance
with both state and federal law is a 'physical impossibility,' or
where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment24
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'
This type of implied preemption is described as "conflict"
preemption.
As is true in matters of potential express preemption,
courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption against all types
of implied preemption that would supplant state legislative authority, particularly where such preemption is urged in actions
implicating accident law. In one court's words: "Where the
state laws at issue affect health and safety issues, there is a
presumption against implied preemption by congressional
25
enactments."
19. See Oglesby, 180 F.3d 458, 461 (2nd Cir. 1999) ("[T]he relevant question is
not whether the federal government has exercised its authority but whether it possesses the power in the first place.").
20. 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
21. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 20701-20903.
22. Napier, 272 U.S. at 613.
23. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
24. Philip Morris, Inc., 122 F.3d 58, 68 (1st Cir. 1997). Accord Oxendine, 649
A.2d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating "Third, preemption results if state law directly conflicts with a federal law in one of two ways: compliance with both federal
and state law is impossible, or state law obstructs the federal purpose.")
25. Oxendine, 649 A.2d at 828 (citing Hillsborough County v.Automated Medical Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)). Accord Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F.
Supp. 239, 245 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (suit against manufacturer of measles, mumps and
rubella vaccine brought by parents of a child who contracted subacute sclerosing
panencephalitis (SSPE)).
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III.
A.

PREEMPTION AND REGULATORY ISSUES

Tobacco Product Labeling

Preemption analysis as it relates to tobacco product matters derives almost exclusively from the Supreme Court decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 26 In Cipollone, the Court
reiterated that "Congress' intent may be 'explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in the structure and
purpose."' 27 Consistent with the discussion of implied preemption, the Court confirmed that even absent express or explicit
preemption, state law may be preempted where "that law actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference

that Congress left no room for the States to supplement

it."'28

The suit in Cipollone was filed in the New Jersey federal
trial court by Rose Cipollone, who would die of lung disease one
year later, and her husband. The plaintiffs alleged that cigarette manufacturers: (1) sold a product that was defectively designed, in that there were safer alternative designs for
cigarettes, and because the social utility of cigarettes was vastly
outweighed by the dangers inhering in their use; (2) failed to
provide adequate warnings; (3) "were negligent in the manner
[that] they tested, researched, sold, promoted and advertised"
cigarettes; (4) breached express warranties as to the lack
of health risks from smoking; (5) fraudulently misrepresented
health risks, thereby neutralizing federally mandated warnings; (6) "ignored and failed to act upon" scientific and medical
data showing the health risks of cigarette smoking; and (7) by
"conspiracy to defraud" combined with other manufacturers to
29
deny the public of medical and scientific information.
Section 5 of the 1965 Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act ("1965 Act"), captioned "Preemption," provided "(a) No
statement relating to smoking and health, other than the [Section 4] statement ... shall be required on any cigarette package," and "(b) no [such] statement ... shall be required in the
26. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
27. Id. at 516.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 509-10. The Cipollone decision itself did not address the issue of
product defectiveness. See Richardson v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 950 F.Supp 700 (D.
Md. 1997).
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advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled
in conformity with" Section 4.30 Section 5 (b) was amended by
the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 ("1969 Act") to
specify that: "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under state law with respect to the
advertising and promotion of any cigarette the packages of
31
which are [lawfully] labeled."
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Congress "had
impliedly pre-empted . . . claims challenging the adequacy of
warnings on labels or in advertising or the propriety of [the
manufacturers'] advertising and promotional activities."32 The
Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part.3 3 The
Court found that the preemptive scope of the 1965 Act and the
1969 Act was governed entirely by the express language of § 5
of each Act, 34 and that, therefore, no justification existed for
35
evaluating the possibility of implied preemption.
At the same time, the Cipollone Court determined that the
appellate court erred in concluding that the preemptive language of the two respective Acts was operatively indistinguishable. In the Court's view, § 5 of the 1965 Act "only preempted
state and federal rule-making bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements and did not preempt state common
law damages actions." 36 The Court reasoned that (1) the presumption against the preemption of state police power regulations required a narrow reading of the 1965 preemption
provision; 3 7 (2) label warning mandated by the 1965 Act's § 4
30. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1340
(West 1965).
31. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1340
(West 1969).
32. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (citing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986)). In so
doing, the Court observed that the Third Circuit had placed unwarranted reliance
upon the fact that the 1969 Act did not alter the statement of purpose from the
1965 Labeling Act. Id. at 517 n. 13.
33. Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); see Richard C. Ausness, The Impact of the
Cipollone Case on Federal PreemptionLaw, 15 J.PROD. & Tox.LIAB. 1 (1993).
34. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 519-20. Elsewhere in its opinion the court uses the terminology
"positive enactment" synonymously with a "mandat[e] [as to] particular cautionary
statements[.]" Id. at 520.
37. See id. at 518-19.
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"does not by its own effect foreclose additional obligations imposed under state law,"38 because the mere fact "that Congress
requires a particular warning does not pre-empt a regulatory
field;" 39 and (3) "there is no general, inherent conflict between
federal preemption of state warning requirements and the con40
tinued viability of state common law damages actions." All of
these considerations led the Court to conclude that § 5 of the
1965 Act "superseded only positive enactments by legislatures
or administrative agencies that mandate particular warning
4
labels." 1
Disagreeing with the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court
found that the preemptive language in the 1969 Act was materially different-and substantially broader in application-than
the preemptive language in the 1965 Act. The Court explained:
First, the [1969] Act bars not simply 'satement[s]' but rather 'requirement[s] or prohibition[s] . . .imposed under State law.' Second, the later Act reaches beyond statements 'in the advertising'
to 'obligations with respect to the advertising or promotion' of
42
cigarettes.
The Supreme Court continued by noting that this broader reading was justified, in part, on the basis that the 1969 Act substantially altered the 1965 Act by "rewriting the label warning,
banning broadcast advertising, and allowing the FTC to regu43
late print advertising."
In addition, the Court found that the phrase "imposed
under state law" is not limited to "positive enactments" obligatiing manufacturers to employ particular cautionary language or
symbols. 44 Focusing on the 1969 Act's broader language of "requirements or prohibitions," 45 the Supreme Court considered
whether or not personal injury claims brought under state law
might operate as a de facto imposition of a requirement or a
prohibition. The question the Court posed could be put this
way: "Does imposition of or vulnerability to a plaintiff's verdict
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 518.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
Id.
Id. at 518-19.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522.
Id. at 521-24.
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arising from a claim that the manufacturer should have provided warnings in addition to those required by the 1969 Act
impose an obligation upon the manufacturer that can be considered a requirement or a prohibition within the meaning of the
1969 Act?" The Supreme Court answered its own question
46
affirmatively.
The Court stated that "the central inquiry" in the matter
before it was straightforward: "We ask whether the legal duty
that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health.., imposed under State law with respect to... advertising or promotion,' giving that clause a fair but narrow reading."4 7 Applying this "straightforward" analysis to the common
law claims advanced by Mrs. Cipollone and her husband, the
Supreme Court held that a products liability action alleging
failure to provide adequate warnings was in essence a claim
that the manufacturer's "post-1969 advertising or promotions
should have included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings[.]" ' 48 Such a failure to warn claim was, by the terms of the
49
1969 Act, preempted.
A different result was appropriate, however, for such tort
claims as were not associated with the advertising or promotion
of cigarettes. Thus, the Supreme Court made clear that the
1969 Act did not operate to preempt claims in tort that might be
based upon "the testing or research practices [of a defendant,]
or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion [of cigarettes.]" 50 Further, the Supreme Court continued, the plaintiffs'
claims for breach of an express warranty were not precluded
insofar as they derived from the contractual nature of the relationship between the seller and buyer, rather than being imposed by state law. 51 Thus, the Cipollone Court concluded "a
common law remedy for a contractual commitment voluntarily
46. See id. at 524.
47. Id. at 523-24.
48. Id. at 524.
49. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524.
50. Id. at 524-25.
51. See id. at 525-26. The Court's evaluation regarding express warranties is
of limited modem significance, as today, unlike the era in which Mrs. Cipollone
began to smoke, no tobacco manufacturer is so incautious as to plump the health
virtues of smoking.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss1/2

12

2000]

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

115

undertaken should not be regarded as a 'requirement ... im52
posed under State law' within the meaning of § 5(b)."
The plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer had engaged
in two distinct types of misrepresentation. Taking each misrepresentation claim in turn, the Court found that a claim for
fraudulent misrepresentation premised upon an allegation that
the advertising practices of the cigarette manufacturers neutralized the effect of federally-mandated warning labels was
preempted by the 1969 Act. 53 Noting the interrelationship between regulatory prohibitions on advertising that downplay
dangers of smoking and the associated statutory requirements
for warnings, the Court found that such a theory of fraudulent
misrepresentation was inextricably related to a theory of failure
54
to warn and was similarly preempted.
The Supreme Court recognized, however, an important distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation claims associated with advertising and other forms or venues of
misrepresentation. An example of the former might be a billboard with an image of young vibrant persons engaged in vigorous physical activity, serving to convey the message that
cigarette smoking is compatible with cardiovascular fitness.
Examples of the latter type of misrepresentation such as evidence that the cigarette manufacturers concealed material facts
from administrative agencies, or that they included false statements of material fact, e.g., carbon monoxide or tar levels, in
55
their advertising, would not be preempted by the 1969 Act.
The Court reasoned that this second type of fraudulent misrepresentation claim was predicated on state law duties to disclose
material facts, rather than on advertising and promotion. To
further clarify the distinction, the Supreme Court stated that in
the former type of alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, such
as billboards, print media and the like, state laws obligating
manufacturers to disclose safety or health risks to administrative agencies were "obligations with respect to advertising or
promotion" and a state law claim premised upon the breach of
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 526.
See id. at 527.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528.
See id.
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that duty would be preempted. 56 Claims that an advertisement
contains a false statement of a material fact, in contrast, are not
"predicated upon a duty based on smoking and health, but
rather on a more general obligation-the duty not to deceive." 5 7
Regarding plaintiffs conspiracy claims, the Court found these,
too, were not preempted, as the duty not to conspire to commit
fraud is not a prohibition "based on smoking and health."58
In summarizing its holding, the Court wrote:
The 1965 Act did not pre-empt state law damages actions; the
1969 Act pre-empts petitioner's claims based on a failure to warn
and the neutralization of federally mandated warnings to the extent that those claims rely on omissions or inclusions in respondents' advertising or promotions; the 1969 Act does not pre-empt
petitioner's claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud
59
and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Souter, concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that
the modified language of § 5(b) in the 1969 Act did not clearly
exhibit the necessary congressional intent to preempt state
common law damage actions. 60 The three Justices concluded,
therefore, that the plaintiffs' various failure to warn and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, as well as express warranty
and conspiracy claims, should not be preempted by the 1969
Act.6 1 Conversely, Justices Scalia and Thomas argued that all
of petitioner's common law claims were preempted by the 1969
62
Act.
i.

Warnings or misrepresentationclaims regarding
second-hand smoke or nicotine addiction

The legislative history is ambiguous as to whether Congress, in either the 1965 or the 1969 Acts, contemplated that
the labeling provisions should cover risks that were then unknown, or as to which the scientific and medical data were in56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 528.
Id. at 528-29.
See id.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31.
See id. at 531-44.
See id.
See id. at 544-56.
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cipient, or as it is sometimes put, "immature." Cipollone did not
address the issue of whether the 1969 Act should be interpreted
to preempt warning or misrepresentation claims regarding
risks allegedly associated with second-hand smoke or nicotine
addiction. Read together, the statements of purpose and the
committee reports underlying the 1965 and the 1969 Acts permit no confident conclusion. Evaluation of whether the 1969
Act ought properly to preempt claims that the manufacturers
fraudulently concealed or purposefully misrepresented information regarding claimed risks of injurious exposure to secondhand smoke or nicotine addiction requires examination of the
legislative tradeoffs, or bargained-for exchanges, if any, that
were involved in the consideration of and drafting of the 1969
Act. In this connection, the legislative history of the 1965 Act
also enjoys a role, as the metes and bounds of congressional consideration in both the 1965 and the 1969 Acts may, to a cautious
extent, be considered collectively.
Section 2 of the 1965 Act declared that the statute's two
purposes were "(1) adequately informing the public that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health, and (2) protecting
the national economy from the burden imposed by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations." 63 Both the statement of the 1965 Act's purpose,
and the language comprising its required labeling, make it clear
that Congress intended the warnings to convey to the public
only that cigarette "smoking" could be hazardous to health.
Section 2 further states that the goal of the mandated warning
language is that of "informing the public that cigarette smoking
can be hazardous to health," while Section 4 of the 1965 Act
required a specific label stating, among other things: "Caution:
Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous To Your Health."64 Nowhere referenced in the statute's statement of purpose or its required labeling is the suggestion that a message was intended
to be conveyed to nonsmokers, i.e., information suggesting that
smoking by others could be hazardous to nonsmokers. It appears, therefore, that in the absence of any arguable revelation
of congressional intent that this too was an objective of the 1965
or 1969 Acts, neither Act can logically be construed to apply to
63. Id. at 514.
64. Cipollone, 505 U.S at 514.
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the health claims arising from the health risks of exposure to
secondhand smoke.
The legislative history for the 1969 Act contains several references to the Congressional authors' awareness of (1) the risks
of inhalation of environmental smoke and (2) the potential that
with the passage of time, additional health risks of tobacco
would be discovered and proved. Senate Report 91-56665 and
the accompanying Conference Report to Public Law 91-222,66
otherwise known as the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969,67 contains several references to cigarette-related health
risks. The fair inference of this is that, in passing the 1969 Act,
(1) Congress was aware of health dangers other than the orthodox litany, i.e., respiratory disease, lung disease, pulmonary
disease; and (2) Congress was further aware of health risks
posed to individuals other than the smokers themselves.
As to the issue of nicotine dependence, the Conference Report to the 1969 Act cited conspicuously a 1967 FTC Report,
filed pursuant to the 1965 Act § 5(d)(2), which stated that the
very fact that "cigarette smoking is so strongly habit forming"
was a basis for its statement that "it is unlikely that a mildly
phrased cautionary statement will have any effect on confirmed
cigarette smokers." 68 The Senate Report later reiterated the
FTC's observations that "another aspect of cigarette smoking
that is ...ignored, and has vital implications in terms of health
hazard, is the fact that cigarette smoking is strongly habit forming."69 As a result of the reports, the FTC recommended the
listing of nicotine content on cigarette packages.
Further reflective of Congress's awareness that not only tar
levels, but also nicotine levels, contributed to the health risks,
S. Rep. No. 91-566 referenced the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's (HEW) recommendation, filed pursuant to
the 1965 Act, that "levels of 'tar' and nicotine in cigarette smoke
should be published on cigarette packages[.]" 70 That the 1969
Act contemplated the potential of new discernible health risks
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

S. REP. No. 91-566, (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2653
H.R. REP. No. 91-897 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676.
See id. See also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1340 (West 1997).
S. REP. No. 91-566 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2655.
Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2656.
Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2655.
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of tobacco use was reflected in § 8 of the Act, "continu[ing] the
requirement that the Secretary of [HEW] . . .transmit reports
to Congress . . . providing current information on the health
consequences of smoking[.]" 71 In addition, the Senate Bill confirmed that the preemption entailed "is narrowly phrased to
preempt only state action based on smoking and health .... It
would in no way," the Report points out, "affect the power of any
state . . . [regarding] the prohibition of smoking in public
buildings [.1"72
Commentators have urged that in the specific context of
second-hand smoke claims, the labeling and advertising requirements do not extend to nonsmokers subjected to secondhand smoke; "reliance on the notice given to smokers via the
labeling act[s] ...cannot apply to nonsmokers, as they are not
the ones who are warned through the contents of the cigarette
label."73 To further the argument that the warning provisions
apply to smokers and not to nonsmokers is the fact that the language of the 1965 Act references the relationship between cigarette "smoking" and health, rather than a reference to the
effects of "smoke" and health, a usage equally available to the
legislative authors of the Act.
As to the question of whether at the very time of passing
the 1969 Act Congress visualized that additional tobacco use
health risks might be discovered, as previously noted, the pertinent Conference Report noted the inclusion of a new § 8 to the
Act that directed HEW to report to Congress "current informa-

tion on the health consequences of smoking..

."74

One potential

interpretation of this provision is that the congressional authors imagined that yet undiscovered health risks tied to tobacco use might be unearthed in the future and that Congress
should not be considered to have preempted that which has not
visualized. However, preemption advocates might respond that
warnings or misrepresentation state law claims associated with
such new risks would bear the unmistakable earmarks of "requirements or prohibitions relating to advertising or promotion
71. Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2662.
72. Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663.
73. Cindy L. Pressman, No Smoking Please: A Proposal for Recognition of
Non-Smokers'Rights Through Torts Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 595 (1993).
74. Id. at 33, 34.
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of cigarettes" as those terms of art have been constructed by the
75
Cipollone Court.
Various state disclosure laws have been held not to trammel preemption provisions under comparable tobacco-related
acts. 76 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling that a state Disclosure Act
was not preempted by either the 1969 Act or the Smokeless To78
bacco Act. 77 At issue was the Massachusetts Disclosure Act,
that required "manufacturers of tobacco products to disclose the
additives and nicotine yield ratings of their products to the
state's public health department." 79 The court in Philip Morris,
Inc. v. Harshbarger° held that the Disclosure Act did not 'relate
to' advertising or promotion because it lack[ed] the requisite
'reference to' or 'connection with' the preempted realm."8' The
appellate court also declared that there existed no evidence to
support defendant's contention that Congress had intended to
impose "national uniformity" with respect to disclosure or ingredient reporting regulations.8 2 To be compared is the decision of
an Alabama federal trial court in Lacey v. LorillardTobacco Co.
Inc.,8 3 in which the court held that common law claims regarding disclosure of cigarette ingredients were preempted by the
1969 Act.
B.

Pesticide, Herbicide and Rodenticide Labeling

In the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA"), Congress established a comprehensive regulatory
system for the registration and labeling of pesticides.8 4 Prior to
being placed into the market, a manufacturer must register a
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 506.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1997).
See id.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 307(B) (West 1996).
Harshbarger,122 F.3d at 58 (citing MAss GEN. LAWS ch. 94, 307(B)).
Id. at 74.
See id.

82. Id. at 85.
83. 956 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
84. See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 1999). See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990-91 (1984); Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th
Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989) (FIFRA is "an elaborate framework
for registration of pesticide use in United States").
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pesticide with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").85
As part of the registration process, the manufacturer must submit a proposed label to the EPA for approval.8 6 FIFRA requires
that the label be "adequate to protect health and the environment"8 7 and be "likely to be read and understood."88 For purposes of this discussion, the preemption issues associated with
FIFRA are limited to the ability of a state to permit common
law damage actions based upon product labeling. The Supreme
89
Court held in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier (Ralph)
that FIFRA does not preempt local governmental regulation of
pesticide use.
FIFRA expressly prohibits states from imposing "any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different
from those required" under the Act.90 Although a state is permitted to regulate the sale or use of a registered pesticide to the
extent that such regulation does not permit a sale or use prohibited by the Act, it is precluded from imposing labeling or packaging requirements which alter, in any way, those imposed by
the EPA. 9 1
i. Decisional law prior to Cipollone v. Liggett Group
Prior to the Court's decision in Cipollone, the lower courts
were divided with regard to the preemptive effect of FIFRA registration and labeling requirements upon suits brought under
state common or statutory law for compensatory damages. In a
pre-Cipollone decision finding no preemption, Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,92 a trial verdict was rendered against Chevron in favor of an agricultural worker who died from pulmonary
fibrosis allegedly contracted through long-term inhalation of
and dermal exposure to the herbicide Paraquat. Plaintiff
claimed that the decedent's injuries were caused by Chevron's
85. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(a) ("Except as provided in this Subchapter, no person in any state may distribute or sell to any person any pesticide that is not registered under this Subchapter").
86. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(1)(C) (West 1999).
87. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136(q)(1)(F), 136a(d) (West 1999).
88. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136(q)(1)(E) (West 1999).
89. 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
90. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136v(b) (West 1999).
91. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136v(a) and 136v(b) (West 1999).
92. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
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failure to adequately label Paraquat to warn against the possibility that chronic inhalation and skin exposure could lead to
lung disease and death. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that in FIFRA and its accompanying regulations (1) there was no express preemption of state common
law actions; (2) there was no implied field preemption of such
claims, as there was no evidence of Congressional intent to occupy the field; and (3) there was no conflict preemption, as compliance with both federal and state law was not mutually
exclusive.
In holding that FIFRA § 136v(b) did not expressly preempt
state tort recovery, the Court of Appeals stated:
While FIFRA does not allow states directly to impose additional
labeling requirements, the Act clearly allows states to impose
more stringent constraints on the use of EPA approved pesticides
than those imposed by the EPA .... Given this provision, Maryland might well have the power to ban Paraquat entirely .... [I]f
a state chooses to restrict pesticide use by requiring that the manufacturer compensate for all injuries or for some injuries resulting
93
from the use of a pesticide, federal law stands as no barrier.
In concluding that there was neither field nor conflict preemption, the court interpreted FIFRA as having primarily a
regulatory aim-to ensure that, from a cost-benefit point of
view, Paraquat, as labeled, does not produce "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."94 The federal appeals court
reasoned that state tort law had both a regulatory and a
"broader, compensatory goal, [and that] conceivably, a label
may be inadequate under state law if that label, while sufficient
under a cost-benefit standard, nonetheless fails to warn against
any significant risk."95 Although, the court continued, an award
of damages for failure to warn imposed a dual obligation upon
the manufacturer, Chevron could comply with both federal and
state law by continuing to use the EPA approved label and by
paying damages.9 6 The court also stated that tort recovery
could promote legitimate regulatory aims by leading manufac93.
94.
adverse
95.
96.

736 F.2d at 1541.
Id. at 1540; see 7 U.S.C.A. § 136(bb) (West 1999) (defining "unreasonable
effects").
736 F.2d at 1540.
See id.
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turers to petition EPA to allow more detailed labeling of their
products, or by influencing the EPA to require revised labels in
light of the new information brought to light through common
law litigation.9 7 Several courts adopted the Ferebee rationale
and held that state common law remedies are not expressly preempted by FIFRA. For example, in Riden v. ICI Americas,
Inc.,98 the court held that FIFRA did not expressly or impliedly
preempt state tort claims, that state common law remedies did
not conflict with FIFRA's purposes, and that FIFRA falls short
of requiring uniform labeling. 99
In contrast, a Michigan federal trial court rejected the Ferebee analysis in Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,100 and held
that the common law claims for failure to warn were preempted. The Fitzgerald court was not persuaded that a manufacturer had an authentic choice with respect to altering a
pesticide's label in response to an adverse jury award. The
court stated that the Ferebee "choice of reaction" analysis
"seems akin to the free choice of coming up for air after being
underwater. Once a jury has found a label inadequate under
state law, and the manufacturer liable for damages for negligently employing it, it is unthinkable that any manufacturer
would not immediately take steps to minimize its exposure to
continued liability."1 ° 1
In reaching its conclusion that FIFRA expressly preempted
any state labeling or packaging requirements different from or
additional to those mandated in FIFRA, the Fitzgeraldcourt relied heavily on Palmer v. Liggett 0 2 and the Palmer court's pur-

97. See id. at 1541.
98. 763 F. Supp. 1500 (W.D.Mo. 1991).

99. See Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D.Ill. 1988)
(adopting Ferebee rationale and concluding that legislative history indicates
FIFRA regulations not intended to be so comprehensive as to occupy field). See also
Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.Ind. 1990); Stewart v. Ortho Consumer Prods., 1990 WL 36129 (E.D.La. 1990); Whitener v. Reilly
Indus., Inc., No. 87-5224, slip op. at 4 (D.Ill. 1989); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,
704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D.Pa. 1989).
100. 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D.Mich. 1987).
101. Id. at 407 (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627-28
(1st Cir. 1987).
102. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
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ported rejection of Ferebee.10 3 The Fitzgerald court held that
whereas federal statute preempts any state regulation of labels,
any recovery in tort is precluded. To hold otherwise "would
have effectively authorized the state to do through the back
door exactly what it cannot do through the front."10 4 Several
courts criticized the Fitzgerald court's reliance on Palmer,10 5 but
followed its conclusion and held that FIFRA preempts common
06
law failure to warn claims.
103. Although the Palmer court noted its dissatisfaction with the Ferebee
"choice of reaction" analysis as it applied to the 1969 Act, it did not question or
criticize its application to FIFRA.
104. Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, 681 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
105. Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 n.13 (W.D.Mo.
1991); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D.Mo. 1989). Palmer,
825 F.2d at 628, distinguished the Ferebee analysis on the basis that:
FIFRA, which applies to some 40,000 different herbicide and pesticide formulations, imposes upon an entirely different type of regulatory scheme
from that established under the [1969] Act. Under FIFRA, each manufacturer drafts a warning label for each product for EPA approval. Thus, two
manufacturers of the same regulated product may use different labels of
their own choosing, provided only that they obtain prior EPA approval ....
In contrast, the [1969] Act explicitly (i) applies to cigarettes only; (ii) mandates the precise language of the label; and (iii) prohibits any state from
regulating any aspect of cigarette warnings.
106. See Yowell v. Chevron Chemical Co., 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo.App. 1992)
(FIFRA preempted state wrongful death claim based upon alleged inadequacy of
pesticide labeling); Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.Mo. 1990);
Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D.Mo. 1989); Kennan v. Dow
Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799 (M.D.Fla. 1989); Little v. Dow Chem. Co., 559
N.Y.S.2d 788 (1990). See also Jenkins v. Anchem Products Inc., 886 P.2d 869
(Kan. 1994) (held: FIFRA preempted common law failure to warn claims as such
claims constituted "requirement[s] for labeling or packaging [.1"); Compare Hurt v.
Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.Mo. 1990), where the court stated that
§ 136v(a) specifically allowed states to regulate the sale or use of any federally
registered pesticide and that there was no conflict with regard to claims based
upon the sale or application of a defective product.
See also Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1284 (W.D.Mo.
1989), in which the federal trial court held that the claim that Paraquat was sold
in an unreasonably dangerous, defective condition when put to its reasonably anticipated use was not preempted, in that there was no Congressional intent to "occupy the field" relating to pesticides and injuries arising from their use. Neither,
the Fishercourt held further, was plaintiffs claim that the aerial spraying of Paraquat was an inherently or abnormally dangerous activity.
In Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.Pa. 1988), the court
held that FIFRA's prohibition of state labeling and packaging requirements did
not preempt state law tort action against an exterminator and a manufacturer
based on the exterminator's alleged failure to warn of dangers associated with
termiticides used in the home. The plaintiffs injuries did not result from the de-
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125

ii. Decisional law after Cipollone v. Liggett Group
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in
PapasI and Papas H provide a temporal bridge between a preCipollone FIFRA analysis and the post-Cipollone approach that
seemingly governs today. In Papas v. Upjohn Co. (PapasI),107
the court noted that the language in FIFRA, as well as its legislative history, could support a determination that state common
law actions based upon inadequate labeling are expressly preempted, but declined to reach the issue. 08 Instead, the court
found that federal preemption of common law tort claims based
upon labeling deficiencies could be implied from FIFRA and the
labeling regulations promulgated pursuant thereto 0 9 The
court reasoned (1) that FIFRA occupied the entire field of labeling regulation, leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law, even by means of state common law tort actions; 110 (2)
that "jury awards of damages in such tort actions would result
in direct conflict with federal law";"' and (3) that "allowing
state common law tort suits for inadequate labeling would
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full objectives of Congress." 1 12 The court stated further that
permitting common law tort actions based on labeling claims
"would permit state court juries to do what state legislatures
and state administrative agencies were forbidden to do: impose
requirements for labeling pesticides."1 3 In the subsequent proceeding before the Supreme Court, the Court vacated Papas I
fendants' failure to comply with federal regulations, but rather from their breach
of a duty to ensure that an appropriate warning reached not only the employees
handling the pesticides but to the ultimate consumers of the pesticide product.
107. 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 505
U.S. 1215 (1992), on remand, 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993) (held: FIFRA expressly preempts state law claims based upon inadequate labeling or packaging).
See also Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993)(PapasII), cert. denied,
Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505 U.S. 1215 (1993) (state law action for damages expressly preempted to extent dependent upon showing pesticide labeling or packaging failed to meet standards in addition to or different from those required by
FIFRA).
108. See Papas 1, 926 F.2d at 1023-24.
109. See id. at 1024.
110. See id. at 1025.
111. Id.
112. 926 F.2d 1019, 1025 (11th Cir.1991). See also Lescs v. Dow Chem. Co.,
976 F. Supp. 393, 400 (W.D.Va. 1997).
113. Id. at 1026.
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and remanded for reconsideration in light of its recent decision
in Cipollone.114 With the Cipollone decision now before it, the
Eleventh Circuit entered its ruling in Papas H, and held that
FIFRA expressly preempted claims based upon inadequate labeling or packaging. 115 A similar conclusion was reached in
MacDonald v. Monsanto Co. ,116 in which the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded that state common law judgments, including those predicated on a failure to warn theory, are "require117
ments" for the purposes of preemption.
In Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 118 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit compared the preemption provisions in
both the 1969 Act and FIFRA and found them sufficiently alike
to compel the conclusion that FIFRA expressly preempted inconsistent state common law demands. 1 19 To like effect, in King
v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,120 a Maine federal trial court
considered whether FIFRA's mandate barring states from imposing requirements on herbicide labels precludes state common law tort claims. After reviewing the legislative history of
FIFRA, the regulations promulgated to govern the registration
of pesticides, and guidance of Cipollone, the King court held:
[FIFRA § 136v(b)] says that states 'shall not impose or continue in
effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or
different from those required under this subchapter ....
Since
the 1969 Cigarette Act, which prohibits states from imposing 'requirements' on cigarette advertising, was held to preempt com114. 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993).
115. Id. See also Clubine v. American Cyanamid Co., 534 N.W.2d. 385 (Iowa
1995) (discussed and limited in Ackerman v. American Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d
208 (Iowa 1998)) (held: claims associated with label-based warranties preempted
by FIFRA as such claims constituted additional or different requirements than
those imposed by FIFRA).
116. 27 F.3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1994).
117. Id. Accord Deshotel v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. La.
1997) (held: label-based claims brought against pesticide manufacturer by farmer
who experienced failure of sweet potato crop preempted). See also Ackles v. Luttrell, 561 N.W.2d 573 (Neb. 1997) (held: claims based upon either failure to warn
or fraudulent labeling claims against pesticide manufacturer preempted by
FIFRA).
118. 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.1993).
119. Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992)).
120. 806 F. Supp. 1030 (D.Me. 1992), affd, King v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 985 (1993) (FIFRA
expressly preempts state tort law claims based upon alleged failure to provide adequate herbicide warning labels).
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mon law damage actions with respect to inadequate warnings in
Cipollone, we hold that the prohibition of 'requirements' under
FIFRA preempts common law damage actions for failure to warn
in the herbicide labeling context.121
Other courts having the opportunity to consider the preemptive effect of FIFRA in light of Cipollone122 have interpreted
the Supreme Court's decision more restrictively. For example,
in Burke v. Dow Chemical Co.,123 the court undertook a detailed
analysis of the statutory language of FIFRA to determine
whether failure to warn claims would amount to a state imposed "requirement for labeling or packaging in addition to or
different from those required [under FIFRA] and would therefore be expressly preempted." 124 The court found that the preemption provision in FIFRA lies "somewhere in between the
[1965 Act] and [1969 Act] provisions. "125 The court stated that
the prohibition upon the state imposing any "requirements" "for
labeling or packaging" "different from" the EPA requirements,
when viewed in conjunction with the general savings clause explicitly authorizing each state to regulate the sale or use of pesticides, "indicate[s] a congressional design to leave the states
with expansive powers to 'regulate' pesticides." 126 Finding the
doctrine of express preemption to be narrow in its scope and,
moreover, that the failure to warn claims were not implicitly
prohibited by FIFRA, 127 the court wrote:
Applying the somewhat subtle distinctions of Cipollone, we hold
that, if EPA-approved labels were in fact affixed to the relevant
containers, plaintiffs may not claim that defendants' products
were mislabeled. If, however, warnings to the trade, warnings
apart from labels or packaging, limitation on sales to professionals, or other protections falling generally within the ambit of
warnings [which] should have been used when the content of the
121. 806 F. Supp. at 1036. See also Casper v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
806 F. Supp. 903 (E.D.Wash. 1992); Brennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 613 So.2d 131
(Fla. Ct.App. 1993).
122. 505 U.S. at 504.
123. 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
124. Id. at 1140.
125. Id. at 1140; see 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136v(a)-(b) (West 1999).
126. 797 F. Supp. at 1140.
127. See id. at 1141.
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label was fixed by EPA there remains a liability question for the
128
trier of fact.

Similarly, in Couture v. Dow Chemical,129 the court held that
"the narrow construction mandated by the preemption analysis
utilized in Cipollone"13° supported an earlier interpretation of
FIFRA in which the court had followed Ferebee, and held that
states are "free to regulate, through common law remedies, the
131
use and sale of pesticides."
It is seen that most courts considering the matter have concluded that FIFRA expressly preempts state law claims that
manufacturers should have used labels or warnings different
from or in addition to those required by federal statute. 132 Importantly, however, FIFRA's preemptive effects are limited to
claims related to labeling or packaging. Other common law
133
products liability or warranty claims may remain viable.

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1140.
804 F. Supp. 1298 (D.Mont. 1992).
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1302. See also Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks, 775

F. Supp. 1339 (D.Mont. 1991), affd, 993 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1993) (common law tort
claims not preempted by FIFRA).
132. See DerGazarian v. Dow Chemical Co., 836 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D.Ark.
1993) (FIFRA preempts state common law insecticide warning or labeling claim);
Kolich v. Sysco Corp., 825 F. Supp. 959 (D.Kan. 1993) (held: warning and labeling
claim against manufacturer of aerosol insecticide labeled in accordance with
FIFRA labeling requirements preempted); Levesque v. Miles, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 61
(D.N.H. 1993) (FIFRA expressly preempts common law failure to warn claim arising from leakage and ignition of a container of insect repellant leaked and ignited);
June v. Carmel Chem. Corp., 602 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1993) (FIFRA preempts
firefighter's failure to warn claim arising from pesticide exposure); Moody v. Chevron Chem. Co., 505 N.W.2d 900 (1993) (failure to warn claim preempted by
FIFRA); Brennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 613 So.2d 131 (Fla.Ct. App. 1993) (FIFRA
preempts plaintiffs claims only to extent those claims were based upon finding
that the product's labeling was inadequate).
133. See DerGazarian,836 F. Supp. at 1429 (FIFRA did not preempt common
law action premised upon insecticide manufacturer's alleged failure to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection and testing of insecticide); Levesque v. Miles,
Inc., 816 F. Supp. 61 (D.N.H. 1993) (FIFRA did not preempt statutory cause of
action for breach of warranty); Bingham v. Terminix Int'l Co., 850 F. Supp. 516
(S.D.Miss.1994) (preemptive scope of FIFRA extends only to claims relating to labeling and packaging; claims involving a failure to test or inspect product, nonlabeling claims for breach of warranty, and claims for defective design or formulation not preempted).
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Motor vehicle safety

In Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, 3 4 the Supreme Court retreated from its Cipollone-grounded focus on express preemption, but in so doing the Court did not necessarily
ease the complexity of federal preemption issues as they affect
motor vehicle safety statutes and regulations. In Geier, the
Court was asked to analyze the effect of the express preemption
provision in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
("NTMVSA" or "Safety Act") on a lawsuit alleging that a 1987
Honda was defective in design because it did not have a driver's
side air bag. The NTMVSA, under which the Department of
Transportation issued a federal motor vehicle safety standard
("FMVSS") which permitted automobile manufacturers in the
late 1980s to choose among three options for passenger safety
restraints, does contain a preemption provision, but also has a
savings clause, described below.
Automobile design defect claims have been examined under
the lens of federal law preemption for many years, and certain
automobile design defect claims have been held preempted by
the NTMVSA. 135 The NTMVSA delegates to the Secretary of
Transportation the authority to establish motor vehicle safety
standards, and the Secretary of Transportation has in turn delegated the duty of standard promulgation to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA").' 36 The
NTMVSA contains a preemption clause that reads:
(b) Preemption.
(1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this
chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe
or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if
the standard is identical to the standard prescribed in this
chapter.137
While the Safety Act by its terms precludes state safety standards with respect to "any motor vehicle or item of motor vehi134.

__

U.S.

__,

120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000).

135. See 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (1996). The NTMVSA was previously codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1381, but in 1994 was recodified.
136. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.50 (current through September 29, 2000); See 49 C.F.R.
§ 501.2 (current through September 29, 2000).
137. 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (West 1996).
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cle equipment of any safety standard... which is not identical
to the Federal standard,"' 138 it contains a savings clause that
reads: "(e) Common law liability.-Compliance with a motor
vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not
1 39
exempt a person from liability at common law."
i. Decisional law preceding Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co.
Prior to the entry of the Supreme Court's decision in Geier,
courts in several jurisdictions had held that compliance with
the criteria for one of the multiple passive restraint options set
forth in the regulations impliedly preempted a tort claim targeting the manufacturer's election not to install airbags. 40 For example, in Taylor v. General Motors, Corp."" the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that plaintiffs state law
claims against the manufacturer of an automobile for failure to
install an airbag was impliedly preempted by the NTMVSA insofar as the manufacturer had sold a product equipped with one
of the other passive restraint options available to it. Because no
Florida appellate court had been presented with such an issue,
the role of the Eleventh Circuit was to predict the outcome
should the matter be heard by the State's highest court.1 42 The
federal appeals court focused on Supreme Court cases involving
federal law preempting, by implication, state law claims, in
which the Supreme Court had ruled that "under the principles
of implied preemption, a state cannot impose common law damages on individuals for doing what a federal act or regulation
'authorized them to do.""' 43 Insofar as personal injury claims
brought under state law could, hypothetically but foreseeably,
conflict with the passive restraint system approach permitted

138.
139.
1974).
140.
141.
142.
143.

15 U.S.C.A. § 1392(d) (West 1974).
49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (West 1996). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (West
49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S5.1(a)-(b) (current through September 29, 2000).
875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1989).
See id.
Id. at 827 (citing Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,

450 U.S. 311, 318 (1981)).
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"take away the
by the Safety Act, to permit such claims would
144
flexibility provided by a federal regulation.
In Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit held that even absent express preemption, standards published by the NHSTA preempted, by implication, a common law claim for defect in
design. The court held that the NHSTA as amended and regulations thereunder, authorizing the manufacturer a choice of
three different methods for occupant crash protection, one of
which being manual seat belts, impliedly preempted a common
delaw claim of design defect for the manufacturer's conscious
1 45
sign choice not to equip an automobile with airbags.
A Wisconsin court of appeals also held that a state law
claim for failure to install airbags in a 1980 Plymouth Horizon
was preempted in circumstances of the defendant's compliance
with the NTMVSA standard. 146 Observing that the phrase
144. Id. (citing Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141 (1982)). See also Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 412-414
(1st Cir. 1988); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1417 (10th Cir. 1996).
145. 875 F.2d at 822 n.13 ("[Wie conclude that a state common law rule that
would, in effect, remove the element of choice authorized in Safety Standard 208
would frustrate the federal regulatory scheme."). See also Myrick v. Freuhauf
Corp. (Myrick I), 795 F. Supp. 1139 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (held: state statutory or common law claims would impose stricter safety standards than established by federal
regulations and were, therefore, preempted).
Accord Loulos v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 882 SW.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). In
Loulos, a motorist's claim against Ford, among others, for failure to equip a 1979
vehicle with airbags, the court held that plaintiffs claim was preempted by the
NTMVSA. The court noted specifically that regulations promulgated pursuant to
the NTMVSA authorized manufacturers to adopt one of four permissible passive
restraint system options, and that to permit a state tort law cause of action would,
in effect, permit punishment of manufacturers for making a choice Congress specifically countenanced.
See also Gills v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F. Supp. 894 (W.D.Ky. 1993) (FMVSS
208, adopted pursuant to NTMVSA, preempted common law claim seeking damages for failure to install airbags); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d
Cir. 1990). In Pokorny the Third Circuit held that state common law claims for
failure to provide either air bags or automatic seatbelts were impliedly preempted
by federal regulations authorizing the manufacturers their choice of safety mechanisms to be installed into the motor vehicle. However, the court held that common
law claims for failure to install additional passive restraint systems not included
among the options listed in Standard 208 were not preempted. See id. at 1126.
146. See Boyle v. Chrysler Corp., 501 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. 1993); see Panarites v.
Williams, 629 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (state law claims arising from a
manufacturer's election of a passive restraint system other than airbags both expressly and impliedly preempted insofar as judgment against manufacturer would
impose safety requirements different from and in addition to those required by
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"'state law'.

. . include[s] common law as well as statutes and
regulations[.]" 1 47 The state appellate court held that because
the defendant complied with the federal act, state law claims,
including common law claims, were preempted. To hold otherwise, the Wisconsin court noted, would have required judicial
entertainment of state law claims that would have created a
conflict with the federal standards. Lastly, the court applied a
conservative interpretation to the Safety Act's saving clause,
and held that "[tihe savings clause does not operate to preserve
common-law liability claims that conflict with the federal safety
standards. Rather, the savings clause preserves only those
common-law liability claims that do not conflict with the auto148
mobile safety equipment standards that Congress enacted."

A harmonious conclusion was reached in the appeal of a
suit bringing state law claims against a manufacturer for failure to install lap seat belts. A Minnesota state appeals court
found the state law claims were impliedly preempted by the
NTMVSA, 149 reasoning that maintenance of potential state law
liability, in effect, would have conflicted with the manufacturer's prerogative under federal regulation to pick one from
among a group of federally-approved passive restraint
systems.150
A limited preemption province was defined by the Seventh
Circuit in Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V., 5 a claim
against a truck manufacturer alleging that its windshield retention system was inadequate to prevent windshield ejection
during collision. The federal appeals court stated the proposition broadly that the savings provision of the Safety Act "was
not to preserve common law claims when they conflict with
NHTSA standards, but to prevent a manufacturer from having
federal government); Dykema v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 525 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1994) (state law claims preempted because they would have subjected manufacturers to different safety standards than established by the NTMVSA).
147. Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521).
148. Boyle, 501 N.W.2d at 869; see also Gills v. Ford Motor Co, 829 F. Supp.
894 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (FMVSS 208, adopted pursuant to NTMVSA, preempted common law claim seeking damages for failure to install airbags); Cellucci v. General
Motors Corp., 706 A.2d 806 (Pa. 1998).
149. See Scholtz v. Hyuandai Motor Co., 557 N.W.2d 613 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
150. See id.
151. 112 F.3d 291 (7th Cir. 1997).
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a complete defense to a common law action not addressed by a
NHTSA standard by merely stating that it is in full compliance
with all federal safety standards.' 1 52 Observing that the Safety
Act's savings provision 53 should not be interpreted as
"preserv[ing] conflicting or non-identical state common law actions from preemption,"15 4 the court held that common law
if, and only if,
claims were not to be preempted by the NHTSA
155
they were identical to the federal standards.
Regarding the windshield retardation standard specifically,
the court noted that in this instance, the agency had specifically
concluded that "given the design of forward control vehicles it
was both technically impracticable to design windshields which
would comply with the standards and impracticable to apply
the standard's barrier crash tests to these vehicles." 56 Given
the NHTSA particularized conclusion that the standard would
not apply, the court held that "a state common law standard on
windshield retention would, accordingly, be a standard that is
157
not identical to the federal one[,]" and was thus preempted.
Thus, even without backdrop of a specific standard, the
NHTSA dormant authority to create a safety standard may preempt a personal injury claim brought under state law. Be the
question one of passive restraint systems or another vehicle
component within the NHTSA's NTMVSA purview, the
agency's decision to forego application of a standard to a particular type of product may still be given preemptive effect. For
example, regarding the safety standard for windshield retention
systems, and the exclusion from that standard of forward control vehicles with a gross vehicle weight exceeding 10,000
pounds, at issue in Garcia, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
explained:
[H]ere there is a specific federal standard addressing windshield
retention for the truck at issue, in which the NHTSA determined
that this type of vehicle should be exempt from the affixing requirement. The Supreme Court has held that "a federal decision
152. Id. at 298.
153. See 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9) (West 1996).

154. 112 F.3d at 298.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 297.
157. Id. at 296.
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to forego regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative
federal determinationthat the area is best left unregulated,and in
that event would have as much preemptive force as a decision to
8
regulate." 15
In Loulos v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc.,159 a motorist's claim
against Ford, among others, for failure to equip a 1979 vehicle
with airbags, the Missouri appellate court held that plaintiffs
claim was not preempted, and refused to consider an implied
preemption theory, reasoning, according to Cipollone, an express preemption provision was "a reliable indicium of congressional intent," terminating implied preemption analysis.160
Regarding Safety Act regulations for illumination, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Buzzard v. RoadRunner Trucking, Inc. 61 held that the plaintiffs state common law
tort claims of inadequate lighting were not preempted. The
court, in its decision, noted the defendant's burden to overcome
the generally applicable rebuttable presumption against a finding of Congressional intent to preempt state law or regulation. 162 Emphasizing Congress's stated goal of increasing
transportation safety and the potential value of permitting
states to enact more stringent regulations than are federally
imposed to achieve that goal, the Third Circuit held that plaintiffs claims were not preempted, and wrote:
Buzzard's action could encourage increased safety by enhancing
motorists' ability to take in at a glance the size, location and
movement of tractor-trailers encountered at night on the public
highways. Encouraging manufacturers to act in a way that increases safety does not frustrate the primary purpose of the
Safety Act. Nor does it make it impossible to comply with both
federal and state law, as it does not suggest that illumination
equipment mandated by state common law be used instead of that
required by federal law, but only in addition to that specified in
Standard 108.163
158. Id. at 296 (emphasis added by appellate court).
159. 882 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). See also Minton v. Honda of
America
160.
161.
162.
163.

Mfg., Inc., 684 N.E.2d 648 (1997).
Id. at 152.
966 F.2d 777 (3d Cir. 1992).
See id. at 780.
Id. at 785.
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A federal trial court in Byrnes v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd.,164
held that a products liability claim against the manufacturer of
the 1990 Honda motorcycle's lighting system was not impliedly
preempted by the NTMVSA, and explained that in the absence
of any reference to the subject matter in the Safety Act, much
less in its preemption provision, no further evaluation of implied preemption was necessary. Also finding no implied preemption is the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengelellschaft,165 in
which the plaintiffs challenged the restraint design of a Volkswagen Jetta. The model at issue had an automatic shoulder
belt, but no lap belt for either the driver or front seat passenger.
Rather, the design employed knee bolsters to restrain the driver
or passenger from sliding beneath the belt upon collision. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's determination that
standards promulgated under the NTMVSA do not preempt
common-law claims, citing the Supreme Court's decision in
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 166 which noted specifically that
there existed no federal safety standard creating a conflict of
compliance.
In Collazo-Santiagov. Toyota Motor Corp.,167 a suit brought
by a motorist claiming that deployment of her vehicle's airbag
caused her facial injuries, a federal trial court found that the
federal standards were not design standards at all, but rather
constituted performance standards. As such, the court
reasoned:
Manufacturers are apparently free to choose any air bag design,
as long as the design meets the performance criteria[.] Thus,
there is no conflict between the provisions of [federal law] nor its
implementing regulations, on the one hand, and tort liability for
defective design, on the other, because such liability "[does] not
frustrate
remove or require any particular choice, or otherwise
68
'flexibility' that the federal scheme provides."

164. 845 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
165. 114 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir. 1997).
166. 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
167. 957 F. Supp. 349 (D.P.R. 1997).

168. Id. at 354 (quoting Perry v. Mercedes Benz, 957 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th
Cir. 1992); 49 U.S.C.A. § 30103(e) (West 1996)).
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Geier v. American Honda Motor Company

In the years following the Supreme Court's 1992 Cipollone169 decision, some courts and commentators have referred to
the Court's
preemption analysis as "schizophrenic" 170 or
"shaky." 171 In Geier v. American Honda Motor Company,172
the
Court seemed to retreat from its Cipollone focus on express preemption, but in so doing did not necessarily simplify matters for
litigants and trial judges seeking the proper doctrinal analysis
by which to answer preemption questions.
In Geier, the review of a lawsuit alleging that a 1987 Honda
was defective in design because it did not have a driver's side
air bag, the Court was asked to identify the specific species and
phylum of the NTMVSA preemption provision. As noted earlier, the NTMVSA authorizes the NHTSA to promulgate and
implement FMVS standards. The NHTSA did so, implementing
a standard that permitted automobile manufacturers during
the applicable time period to choose among three options for
passenger safety restraints, while stating further that compliance with federal safety standards would not "exempt any person from any liability under common law." 173 In Grier, the
Court held that this statutory provision does not expressly preempt state common law damages actions, but, rather, that "or174
dinary preemption principles" do.
The express preemption clause of the NTMVSA provides
that states may not maintain "motor vehicle safety standards"
which conflict with federal performance standards on the same
topic. In FreightlinerCorp. v Myrick, 175 which involved the effect of the absence, at that time, of a federal standard pertaining to anti-lock brakes, the Court, in a unanimous opinion
written by Justice Thomas, concluded that since there was no
federal standard in issue on the topic for eighteen-wheel trucks,
169. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
170. Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of
State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REv. 559, 627 (1997).
171. Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 96 F.3d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1996)
(the Supreme Court's preemption analysis makes its application "shaky" in "a
changing legal climate.").
172.

__

U.S.

__,

120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000).

173. Id. at 1915
174. Id. at 1913.
175. 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
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there was no express or implied preemption of state design defect claims based on the absence of such brakes. The Court did
not reach the question of whether the Safety Act would preempt
such claims if a federal standard did exist, but in the course of
its opinion, the Court raised a question about the scope of Cipollone's express preemption analysis:
The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a
statute 'implies'-i.e., supports a reasonable inference-that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that
the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied
pre-emption. ... At best, Cipollone supports an inference that an
express preemption clause forecloses implied preemption; it does
176
not establish a rule.
The unanimous decision in Myrick, it is seen, foreshadowed
a potential reinvigoration of the doctrine of implied preemption.
Some commentators noted that the Court's preemption analysis
after Cipollone, Myrick, and its 1996 decision in Medtronic,177
was less and less a true express preemption analysis and more
and more a veiled implied preemption analysis. 178 Geier 179
proved this observation to be true. Justice Breyer, writing for
the majority in Geier, articulated a three-part preemption analysis: Does the express preemption provision explicitly preempt
the lawsuit? If not, "do ordinary preemption principles nonetheless apply?" 80 If so, does the lawsuit "actually conflict" with
the federal statute? Of primary importance was how the Court
answered the second question because if "ordinary," also known
as "implied," preemption principles applied in the face of an express provision to the contrary, then the continued influence of
Cipollone and Medtronic beyond their precise subject matter
precincts-tobacco labeling and medical devices respectivelywould arguably be ripe for recalibration.
176. Id. at 289.
177. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
178. See e.g. Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emptionPresumption That Never
Was: Pre-emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 1379, 1418-1419
(1998).
179.

__

U.S.

__

120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000). Geier was a five to four opinion.

Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Stevens, the author of both the
Cipollone and Medtronic plurality opinions, dissented in an opinion in which Justices Souter, Thomas and Ginsberg joined.
180. Id. at 1918.
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Neither in its analysis of the NTMVSA preemption provision nor the Safety Act's preemption clause did the majority expend the time necessary to provide lower courts with such
guidance as has been characteristic of the Court's prior preemption decisions. The Grier Court declined to focus upon the
meaning of the language of the NTMVSA preemption provision
to determine its scope, including, without limitations, the question of what is meant by "standard," as distinct from the term
"requirement" emphasized in the Cipollone line of decisions. Instead, the Court concluded, with little fanfare, that the "savings
clause" made that exercise unnecessary, and explained its reticence to interpret the term "standard" as based upon its conclusion that it should be read to include common law damages
actions because the savings clause assumes "that there are
some significant number of common-law liability cases to
save." 18 In essence, the Court found that the presence of the
savings clause triggered a narrow reading of the express preemption provision, and that further, in order to give meaning to
the savings clause, it operated to exclude common law damages
82
actions from the preemption clause's reach.
D.

Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics

Manufacturers of pharmaceuticals are subject to the labeling and formulation standards articulated by the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). 8 3 Also, pharmaceutical sellers and
manufacturers may be held strictly liable for injuries that result from their failure to warn of product dangers that are
84
known or knowable within the scientific field.
In the realm of pharmaceuticals, the FDCA contains no lan85
guage expressly preempting claims brought under state law.
Moreover, courts considering the issue have held generally that
with regard to health and safety issues, the statutory language
181. Id.
182. See id. stating, "We have found no convincing indication that Congress
wanted to preempt not only state statutes and regulations, but also common-law
tort actions." Id. at 1918.
183. 21 U.S.C. § 301-394 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
184. See Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996) (citing Anderson
v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (1991)).
185. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1299 (D. Minn 1988).
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does not evince a congressional objective to so occupy the field of
pharmaceutical regulation as to impliedly preempt state
claims. l 6 Support for this conclusion can be found in MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 8 7 in which the court rejected the manufacturer's preemption defense.1 88
The
MacDonald court held that "[t] he regulatory history of the FDA
requirements belies any objective to cloak them with preemptive effect." 18 9
The Supreme Court has held that where Congress has not
expressly preempted state tort law claims, there exists a strong
presumption against implied preemption unless there are exceptional circumstances involved. 190 The District Court in
Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc.' 9 1 inferred from the absence of express preemption that Congress, via the FDCA, had not intended to preempt state regulations imposed upon a vaccine's
92
manufacture, distribution and labeling.
As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Merrell Dow Phamaceuticalsv. Oxendine, 93 a Bendectin suit,
"FDA prescription drug regulations and safety determinations
are intended to be minimum standards which 'do not conflict
with state law which sets higher standards for due care and
safety in the manufacture of drugs.'"' 94 One federal trial court
described the underlying rationale for finding no necessary conflict between state tort remedies and FDA regulation in terms
of the differing objectives of regulation and actions in tort:
[F]ederal regulation serves a very different purpose than state
tort law. Essentially, federal regulation serves a deterrent pur186. See Reese v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75
(1995), review granted,34 Cal. App. 4th 19, 39 Cal. App. 4th 160, 43 Cal. App. 4th
1317. Special issues concerning medical devices and the statutory and regulatory
treatment pertinent thereto are discussed in § III(D). See Richard C. Ausness,
Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C.L. REV. 218-225
(1993).
187. 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
188. See Ausness, supra note 186, at 218-25.
189. Id. at 219 (quoting MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 70).
190. See Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 239, 246 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 726 (1981)).
191. 742 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
192. See id. at 248.
193. 649 A.2d 825 (D.C. App. 1994).
194. Id. at 828 (citations omitted).
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pose by limiting the manufacture of inherently dangerous products to those applicants who meet stringent safety standards,
while state tort law serves the equally important purpose of compensating individuals injured by those very same products. Since
compliance with FDA regulations will not insure that a manufacturer's products will not cause injury, compliance will not necessarily exempt a manufacturer from liability. When those
products do cause injuries, the state tort system provides a means
of compensation. State tort law is intended to supplement federal
regulation by providing a vehicle for compensation of vaccine-re195
lated injuries.
Many individuals have brought actions against diphtheria,
pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccine manufacturers. 196 The absence of an express congressional declaration as to whether federal regulation preempts state law concerning the labeling and
design of the DPT vaccination has led to a split in the decisional
law. 197 Many courts have held that FDA approval of the DPT
vaccine does not preempt more stringent state standards.
These courts reason that the product's design may not necessarily be the safest, technologically achievable design, because the
FDA is only able to approve those designs that are submitted by
the manufacturers. Therefore, the reasoning continues, states
are able to impose higher standards upon these manufacturers,
98
in order to promote product and public safety.
While the FDCA contains no provision that would expressly
preempt state food and drug requirements in general, there are
several areas where the FDA has interposed product specific or
195. Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 239, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (citations omitted) (suit against manufacturer of measles, mumps and rubella vaccine).
196. See Ausness, supra note 186, at 219.
197. Compare Wack v. Lederle Labs., 666 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (disallowing defendant's claim of implied "field" preemption based on FDA's extensive
regulation of the subject matter); Patten v. Lederle Labs., 676 F. Supp. 233 (D.
Utah 1987); MacGillivray v. Lederle Labs., 667 F. Supp. 743 (D.N.M. 1987) (state
tort remedies allowed) with Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories (HurleyI), 651 F. Supp.
993 (E.D.Tex. 1986) (DPT design actions preempted by the comprehensive nature
of FDCA's testing requirements); Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332
(C.D. Cal. 1987). But see Hurley v. Lederle Labs. (Hurley 1H), 863 F.2d 1173 (5th
Cir. 1988) (although plaintiffs failure to warn claims preempted by the FDCA,
other state tort remedies permitted as Congressional intent to protect industry or
product not sufficient to strip plaintiffs of claims against any manufacturer that
has achieved regulatory compliance).
198. See id.
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subject matter specific rules which are not identical to state
standards, or which would be vulnerable to a conflict with a
later promulgated state standard. In some of these settings, the
agency's regulatory initiatives have been held to impliedly preempt inconsistent state claims or regulations. 199 The Supreme
Court has explained that even conceding that most statutes and
accompanying regulations administered by the FDA do not expressly preempt state statutory or decisional law, such FDA
statutes may be found to impliedly preempt state law where application of state law would frustrate effectuation of "the full
purpose and objective" of the FDA's broad ranging safety-related mandates.2 0 0 As is characteristic of agencies charged with
implementing federal health and safety statutes, the FDA has
interpreted both its governing statute and its own regulations
as carrying a broad preemptive mantle. For example, in 1982,
the FDA issued a Final Rule on Tamper-Resistant Packaging
Requirements for Certain Over-the-Counter Human Drug and
Cosmetic Products 20 1 due to a tragic incidence of product tampering of over the counter (OTC) drugs. 20 2 According to the final
FDC rule, all OTC drug products that are subject to retail sale
must be packaged in specific tamper-resistant packages
(TRPs). 20 3 The FDA stated that as the manufacturing and distribution of these products is national in scope, only national
regulations are adequate to safeguard the interest of "the entire
population." 20 4 Its rule provided further that all local or state
199. See Geiger and Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability for Presription
Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform
PharmaceuticalSafety Standards,45 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 421 (1996) ("[Sltate tort
law should be preempted because it may well discourage the development or marketing of beneficial drugs. The possibility of deterring development is contrary to
the FDC Act's fundamental goal of making such drugs available.") (citations
omitted).
200. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496.
201. 21 C.F.R. § 211.132 (current through September 29th, 2000)(cited in 46
FOOD DRuG COSM. L.J. 629, 639 (1991).
202. See Lewis v. Beeler, 949 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1991); Elsroth v. Johnson &
Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); McNeilab, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co.,
645 F. Supp. 525 (N.J. 1986).

203. See 21 C.F.R. § 211.132(a). There were certain exceptions to this rule,
including dermatological, dentifrice, and insulin products that did not have to be
packaged in compliance with the ruling. See 46 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 629, 639.
204. 47 Fed.Reg. 50442-01, 50448 (1982), discussed in Mark B. Gelbert, State
Statutes Affecting the Labeling of OIC Drugs: Constitutionality Based on Com-
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packaging requirements that were not identical to the new federal regulation were specifically preempted by the new
20 5
regulation.
The FDA supplied three justifications for preemption in
this area. First, if localities were permitted to have specific local requirements, the supply of specific OTC drugs might be diminished if those drugs did not comply with the local packaging
requirements. Second, the federal requirements could be essentially negated if a large state could force a drug manufacturer to
use that state's standards throughout the country. Third, the
product cost for each drug would substantially increase if the
drug manufacturers were forced to adopt the different packag20 6
ing requirements for different states.
The FDA maintains that its requirement of a pregnancy
warning on a broad range of OTC drug products has been held
to impliedly preempt all associated state regulations. 20 7 In
1982, the FDA issued the rule that required "[a]ll over-thecounter drugs that are intended for systematic absorption, unless specifically exempted" to contain the warning: "As with any
drug, if you are pregnant or nursing a baby, seek the advice of a
health professional before using this product." 208 While some
states, such as California, had adopted similar legislation, the
FDA felt that "[p1roliferation of such state requirements may
weaken FDA's efforts to develop comprehensive national labeling and other requirements for OTC drugs. ."..,,209 If each state
had different warnings, the FDA suggested, such state by state
warning requirements would "prevent the full purpose and
objectives of the agency in issuing the regulation and that
under the doctrine of implied preemption, these State require2 10
ments are preempted by the regulation as a matter of law."

merce Clause and FederalPreemption Theories, 46 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 629, 640
(1991).
205. 47 Fed. Reg. at 50447.
206. See Gelbert, supra note 204, at 640.
207. 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.63(a), (330.2) (current through September 29th, 2000),
cited in Gelbert, supra note 204, at 640.
208. 47 Fed.Reg. 54,750-01 (1982).
209. 47 Fed.Reg. 39,470-01, 39471 (1982).
210. 47 Fed.Reg. 54,750-01, 54,756 (1982).
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In Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 211 the Supreme Court held
that inconsistent state food labeling regulations were impliedly
preempted by the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act ("FPLA")
and regulations thereunder. At issue in Rath Packing was a
California statute that regulated the labeling of the net weight
of food commodities. 2 12 The record below was sufficient to show
that the average net weight for a proportion of this seller's bacon and flour was less than the net weight stated on the packages, resulting in subsequent removal of those commodities
from the shelves insofar as they were in violation of the California statute. 21 3 The food packing company claimed that the state
statute was preempted by federal laws which regulated labeling
and the net weight requirements, 21 4 drafted by Congress with
the intent of informing consumers of accurate information
about a package's quantity and contents. 2 15 The Court found
that the FDCA did not preempt the state requirements because
the FDCA did not "contain a preemption clause with regard to
its food misbranding requirements [.1' 216 The Court explained
that the issue of express preemption arises when the "state requirements are less stringent than or require information different from federal law," 217 and further found that the
California law was not expressly preempted by any provision of
the FPLA as the California law was more stringent than the
federal requirements and did not require any information that
was different from the federal law. 2' 8 Even absent express preemption, however, the Court concluded that the federal FPLA
regimen impliedly preempted the state law inasmuch as effectuation of the state law would "prevent the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress in pass219
ing the FPLA."

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

430 U.S. 519 (1977), reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977).
See id. at 522.
See id.
See id. at 523-24.
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1451 (West 1997).
430 U.S. at 538.
Id.
See id. at 540.
Id. at 543.
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Medical Devices
i. Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 generally

The Food and Drug Administration is empowered by the
1976 Medical Device Amendments ("MDA")220 to the FDCA221 to
classify and regulate medical devices. Medical devices have
been divided into three categories: Class I devices are subject to
"general controls" insofar as they represent only a low level of
risk to public health and safety. 222 Class II devices are governed by an order of federal regulation known as "special controls,"223 a higher level of superintendence because "general
controls by themselves are insufficient to provide reasonable as224
surances of the safety and effectiveness of [such] devices."
Lastly, Class III devices are subject to the most rigorous MDA
controls as they represent "a potential unreasonable risk of ill225
ness or injury."
As to devices denominated as Class III, the MDA provides:
"Before a new Class III device may be introduced to the market,
the manufacturer must provide the MDA with 'reasonable assurance' that the device is both safe and effective." 2 26 The process of providing the FDA with "reasonable assurance" is known
as "premarket approval" or "PMA."227 The process by which a
new class III device may gain premarket approval was described by the Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 228 as
involving submission of detailed safety and efficacy information
about the device followed by equally meticulous FDA review. 229
Upon receipt of PMA, marketing of the device may begin. Sub220. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b)-(f) (West 1999); 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1999).
221. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (West 1999).
222. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (West 1999), discussed in Oja v. Howmedica,
Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 786 (10th Cir. 1997).
223. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (West 1999); 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2) (2000).
224. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B)(West 1999). See Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111
F.3d 782, 786 (10th Cir. 1997).
225. Id.
226. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)(West 1999). See Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), stating, "With respect to medical devices that
represent the highest risk to human life, the federal government imposes standards specific to each of those devices, and Congress has declared that the federal
standard is preemptive." Id. at 880.
227. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).
228. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
229. See id. at 477.
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sequent changes in the product trigger a requirement that the
230
manufacturer submit a PMA supplemental application.
Moreover, the regulations require annual post-approval reports
detailing changes in the device, clinical investigational results,
2 31
or pertinent scientific literature.
Two exceptions exist as to the general requirement that
Class III medical devices obtain premarket approval. First, the
MDA includes a "grandfathering" provision that permits devices that were on the market prior to the 1976 passage of the
MDA to remain on the market until the FDA undertakes and
completes the required PMA. 232 Second, as the Supreme Court
would later summarize, and "to prevent manufacturers of
grandfathered devices from monopolizing the market while new
devices clear the MDA hurdle, and to insure that improvements
to existing devices can be rapidly introduced into the market,"
the MDA "also permits devices that are 'substantially
equivalent' to preexisting devices to avoid the PMA process."2 33
ii.

Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 preemption
provision

The MDA's preemption provision states:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use
any requirement (1) which is different from or in addition to any
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2)
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device
234

The FDA has interpreted this preemption provision in these
terms:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the [FDA]
has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other
specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the
Act, thereby making any existing divergent state or local require230. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (current through September 29th, 2000).
231. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.84 (current through September 29th, 2000).
232. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A) (West 1999); 21 C.F.R. § 814.1 (c)(1) (current through September 29th, 2000).
233. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478 (1996) (citation omitted).
234. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (West 1999).
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ments applicable to the device different from or in addition to, the
23 5
specific [FDA] requirements.
iii. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr and the decisional law
thereafter
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 236 was a products liability claim
against the manufacturer of a failed pacemaker. On the issue of
potential preemption, the manufacturer argued that plaintiffs
claims were preempted by the FDA's "general 'good manufacturing practices' regulations, which establish general requirements for most steps in every device's manufacture, and by the
FDA labeling regulations, which require devices to bear various
warnings."237 The Court was unanimous in finding that these
general FDA strictures did not constitute specific FDA requirements applicable to a particular device. 238 Rather, the court
concluded that as to MDA § 510(k) devices, state products liability claims would not be preempted, as the § 501(k) process
"does not constitute FDA approval of the safety or effectiveness
of the device, but was merely the preservation of the pre-1976
status quo, which included potential liability under state
law."239

The Medtronic Court adopted a two-pronged inquiry to determine if a state regulation was preempted by regulations or
policies issued by the FDA. First, the federal requirement had
to be "applicable to the device" in question, 240 i.e., the federal
requirement would have preemptive effect only if it was "specific" to a "particular device." 24 1 Second, the state requirement
had to be "different from, or in addition to" the federal requirement, 242 and thus "[sitate regulations of 'general applicability'
235. 21 C.F.R. § 801.1(d) (current through September 29th, 2000).
236. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
237. Id. at 483-84 (citations omitted).
238. Id. at 498-99.
239. Martin v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir.
1997) (interpreting Medtronic).
240. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 472 (quoting 21 U.S.C.§ 360k (West 1999)).
241. Id. at 472 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 801.1(d) (current through September
29th, 2000)).
242. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k (West 1999)).
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are not preempted except where they have 'the effect of estab243
lishing a substantive requirement of a specific device."'
Speaking finally of the relationship between the PMA process and the limited MDA 510(k) procedure, the Supreme Court
stated:
Thus, even though the FDA may well examine § 510(k) applications for Class III devices (as it examines the entire medical device industry) with a concern for the safety and effectiveness of
the device,... it did not 'require' Medtronic's pacemaker to take
any particular form for any particular reason; the agency simply
allowed the pacemaker, as a device substantially equivalent to
one that existed before 1976, to be marketed without running the
gauntlet of the PMA process .... There is no suggestion in either
the statutory scheme or the legislative history that the § 510(k)
exemption process was intended to do anything other than maintain the status quo with respect to the marketing of existing medical devices and their substantial equivalents. That status quo
included the possibility that the manufacturer of the device would
have to defend itself against state-law claims of negligent
design. 244
In Medtronic, the Court appeared to build on its analysis in
Cipollone, focusing on express and not implied preemption analysis. It concluded that the FDA regulations did not expressly
preempt damages actions based on the design of the pacemaker
in question because the language of the express preemption provision, which preempted state "requirement[s] . . . different
from or in addition to" any federal requirement related to safety
or effectiveness, was not intended to include common law damages actions based on design defects in instances where there
was no device-specific federal requirement with which such a
claim actually conflicted.
Of the various Medtronic opinions, that of Justice Stevens
garnered the plurality. Redolent of the express preemption
analysis articulated in Cipollone, the plurality wrote:
243. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (current through September 29th,
2000)). See also discussion in Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 787-788 (10th
Cir. 1997).
244. Id. at 493. See also Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 103 F.3d 442 (5th Cir.
1997). See generally Robert J. Katerberg, Patchingthe "Crazy Quilt" of Cipollone:
A Divided Court Rethinks FederalPreemption of Products Liability in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1440 (1997).
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[Wie have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly preempt state law causes of action .... [W]e "start with the assump-

tion that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.". . . [W]e used a "presumption against
the preemption of state police power regulations" to support a
narrow interpretation of such an express command in Cipollone.
That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns and
the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and
safety.245

A majority of the justices would have included common law
damages actions within the scope of the preemption provision
but, again, differed on whether that particular preemption provision was to be interpreted narrowly or broadly. The plurality
found no preemption by interpreting the scope of the statute
and regulations narrowly, using the legislative history and the
FDA's own interpretation as support. None of the justices applied an implied preemption analysis. 246 The concurring opinion of Justice Breyer confirmed the importance of Congressional
intent in determining the statute's preemptive scope and complained of the "highly ambiguous" nature of the preemption provision in issue, requiring that courts look elsewhere for help as
to "just which federal requirements preempt just which state
requirements, as well as just how they might do so."247 Justice
Breyer's frustration over Congress's inability to clearly identify
and plainly state the purpose and the scope of this and other
preemption provisions, together with his explicit dissatisfaction
with the task of interpreting ambiguous language, foreshadowed the Court's return, in Grier v. American Honda Motor
Company, to a focus on the implied preemption doctrine. 248

245. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted).
246. Id. But see Justice Stevens's plurality opinion, which ended with the following cryptic notation: "Until such a case [announcing a device specific requirement which might require preemption] arises, we see no need to determine
whether the statute explicitly preempts such a claim. Even then, the issue may
not need to be resolved if the claim would also be preempted under conflict preemption analysis, see Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995)." Id. at 503
(italics omitted).
247. Id. at 505.
248.

__

U.S.

__,

120 S. Ct. 1919, 1927 (2000).
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In Martin v. American Medical Systems, Inc.24 9 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the MDA did not preempt common law tort and implied warranty claims brought,
under Virginia law, by a penile implant recipient alleging that
he suffered an injurious infection due to a lack of the device's
sterility. 250 Explaining its decision, the federal appeals court
stated: "Because the 1976 amendments so abruptly changed
the status quo, Congress was compelled to take the existing
market into account. Any device on the market at the time was
permitted to stay on the market until and unless the FDA, after
conducting a review like that for new devices, ordered otherwise."251 Simple identification or classification regulations have
been held not to preempt state regulation. As such, federal regulations do not "relate to the safety or effectiveness of the
252
device.1
Another departure from the PMA process is for investigational devices. The MDA exempts investigational devices from
the PMA process "to encourage, to the extent consistent with
the protection of public health and safety and with ethical stan249. 116 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1997).
250. Id. at 105.
251. 116 F.3d at 103 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e (b) (1) (A) (West 1999)); see also
Sylvester v. Mentor Corp., 663 So.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1995), in which the state appellate court followed Medtronic and held that the MDA § 360k did not apply to those
medical devices which had been allowed to enter the stream of commerce subjected
to only the premarket notification process by being "substantially equivalent" to a
product already on the market. Id. at 178. See also Dutton v. AcroMed Corp., 691
N.E.2d 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997), which held that devices allowed to enter the market via the "substantial equivalence" standard were not subject to the blanket preemption under the MDA. Id. at 740. The appellate court also held that Plaintiffs
claim of fraudulent misrepresentation was not preempted because the MDA
preempts claims raised as to the device's safety and effectiveness, not fraudulent
misrepresentation. Id. at 742. But see English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477 (3d
Cir. 1995), holding that the fact that the inflatable penile implants had been introduced to the market via the "substantial equivalence" test preempted state law
claims against the manufacturers. Id. at 482. The court reasoned that the MDA
preempted the state law claims because the "substantial equivalence" test or standard was related to the product's safety and effectiveness, barring the implementation of state standards of the same. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded for reconsideration in light of Medtronic. Id. at 482-83.
252. Kealoha v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 82 F.3d 894, 898-99 (9th Cir.
1996) (action brought by recipient of temporomandibular jaw (TMJ) implants
against supplier of raw polytetraflouroethylene (PTFE) used in the manufacture of
the implants). Accord Anguiano v. DuPont, 44 F.3d 806, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1995);
LaMontagne v. DuPont, 41 F.3d 846, 853 (2d Cir. 1994).
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dards, the discovery and development of useful devices intended
for human use." 253 Unlike the "substantial equivalent" § 510(k)
process, however, which can be completed in an average of only
20 hours, 254 investigational device status only is granted after a
comprehensive and particularized procedure in which the applicant must set forth a report of all prior investigations, as well as
a "description of the methods, facilities, and controls used for
the manufacture, processing, packing storage, and, where appropriate, installation of the device, in sufficient detail so that a
person generally familiar with good manufacturing practices
can make a knowledgeable judgment about the quality control
used in the manufacture of the device." 255 It is in the context of
these exacting standards and others 256 that FDA approval of investigational devices has been held to preempt state law products liability claims. Thus, in Martin v. Telectronics Pacing
Systems, Inc.,257 a case involving an implantable cardioverterdefibrillator-demand pacemaker, one of only 50 such devices,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "where the FDA
has specifically approved the design of the device for investigational purposes," to permit a state law design defect claim
"would thwart [the federal] goals of safety and innovation[,]"
and, accordingly, investigational device approval would be held
258
to preempt the common law claim.
In other settings, such as claims relating to super absorbant tampons, there have been numerous cases concerning
tampons and toxic shock syndrome which have held that general FDA requirements of warning statements do, in actuality,
constitute particularized FDA regulations that are specific to a
particular device. 259 As tampons have been classified as Class
III medical devices, the FDA requires that certain information
and warnings be affixed to the product and that the average
253. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(1) (West 1999).
254. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 479.
255. 21 C.F.R. § 812.20(b)(3) (current through September 29th, 2000).
256. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.25 (current through September 29th, 2000) (descriptions of methodology, protocols, controls, written procedures, etc.).
257. 105 F.3d 1090 (6th Cir. 1997).
258. Id. at 1099.
259. See e.g., National Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. Kimberly-Clark
Corporation, 38 F.3d 988 (1994).
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individual be able to understand that information. 260 For example, the district court in Krause v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.261 held
that the state law claims as to the sufficiency of warnings or
labels were preempted, but that claims of negligence or claims
of breach of an implied warranty were not. 262 In Papike v. Tambrands, Inc. 263 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the

same conclusion, holding that "[tihe tampon labeling regulation
is device-and disease-specific and preemption is warranted
in this case."264 In making its decision, the court noted the

highly individualized tampon labeling requirements set forth in
265
FDA regulations.
Upholding the principle that FDA regulations preempt
state regulations concerning inadequate warning claims with
regard to tampons, there is authority to the effect that "FDA
labeling requirements, which establish a uniform standard,
were intended to strike a balance between product safety and
protecting interstate commerce from the undue burdens imposed by non-uniform standards."266 Because of the detailed
warning requirements concerning toxic shock syndrome, many
plaintiffs fight an uphill battle when litigating a negligence or
breach of implied warranty claim. The court in Krause noted
that the "plaintiff may have a difficult time establishing and
proving her negligence and breach of warranty claims." 267 The
plaintiff in Haddix v. Playtex Family Products,Corp.268 was un-

able to maintain her burden of proving that the tampon was
unreasonably dangerous because of the warnings concerning
toxic shock syndrome that were affixed to the product's pack269
age, as mandated by federal law.

260. See Ausness, supra note 186, at 227-28 (citing 21 CFR § 884.5460(b))
(current through September 29th, 2000)).
261. 749 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
262. See id. at 169.
263. 107 F.3d 737 ( 9 th Cir. 1997).

264.
265.
266.
F. Supp.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 742.
Id. at 739-40.
Ausness, supra note 186, at 228 (citing Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721
1058, 1063 (D. Minn. 1989)).
Krause, 749 F. Supp. at 169.
138 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 686.
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Miscellaneous Productand Subject Classifications

Congress has included preemption-like language in numerous statutes in addition to those highlighted in the previous sections. Some of these legislative initiatives are fairly old, while
others are quite modern. As has been seen, the law of federal
preemption "to a large extent defies useful generalization [.1"270
Rather, "[tihe cases are very specific to the regulated subject
[matter] .271
i. Federal Boat Safety Act
The Federal Boat Safety Act ("FBSA")272 is intended to promote boating safety through various means that include, inter
alia, requiring manufacturers of certain boating equipment to
comply with safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of
Transportation.2 7 3 The Coast Guard is the federal agency to
which this regulatory function is delegated. 274 In 1988 the
Coast Guard "directed" the National Boating Safety Advisory
Council to evaluate whether or not the Coast Guard should promulgate a regulatory standard requiring propeller guards. The
Council recommended that no such regulatory action be
taken. 275 The Coast Guard adopted the Council's recommenda270. Gurrieri v. William Zinsser & Co., 728 A.2d 832, 836 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999) (citing WILLIAM A. DRIER ET AL., NEW JERSEY PRODUCTS LIABILITY
& Toxic TORTS LAW § 6.3 -.5 (1999)).
271. Id.
272. 46 U.S.C.A. § 4301 et seq (West 2000).
273. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 4302(a)(1) (West 2000).
274. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 4303(a) (West 2000); see Carstensen v. Brunswick
Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 431 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 866 (1995).
275. See National Boating Safety Advisory Council, Report of the Propeller
Guard Subcommittee 14 (1989), stating:
The regulatory process is very structured and stringent regarding justification. Available propeller guard accident data do not support imposition of a
regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats. Regulatory action is
also limited by the many questions about whether a universally acceptable
propeller guard is available or technically feasible in all modes of boat operation. Additionally, the question of retrofitting millions of boats would certainly be a major economic consideration. The Coast Guard will continue to
collect and analyze data for changes and trends ....
The Coast Guard will
also review and retain any information made available regarding development and testing of new propeller guard devices or other information on the
state of the art.
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tion, and in official correspondence recognized and detailed its
27 6
ongoing supervision of this subject matter.
The issue of whether the Coast Guard's decision not to implement a standard requiring propeller guards on recreational
boats preempted state law personal injury claims arising from a
claimed causal connection between the absence of such guards
and injuries suffered was litigated in Ryan v. Brunswick
Corp.27 7 The suit was brought by the wife of a swimmer who
was killed following an accident in which he came into contact
with a revolving propeller on a recreational watercraft. 2 78 The
FBSA preemption provision reads:
[A] state... may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law
or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated
equipment performance standard or imposing a requirement for
associated equipment ... that is not identical to a regulation prescribed under [this title].279
The Michigan Supreme Court, evaluating the FBSA language "law or regulation" with the preemptive language "requirement or prohibition" in the statute interpreted in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,28 0 found the difference between the two
phrases to be "insignificant." 28 ' Finding that the federal regulatory decision that propeller guards should not be required preempted state tort law claims based upon the absence of such
devices, the Ryan court noted that it was "join[ing] numerous
other courts that have held that '[ci ommon law causes of action
may constitute state regulation and [impermissibly] impose a
requirement on manufacturers to have propeller guards
28 2
through an award of damages"'

276. Letter from Rear Admiral Robert T. Nelson, Chief, Office of Navigation,
Safety and Waterway Service, to A. Newell Garden, Chair., National Boating
Safety Advisory Council.
277. 557 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 1997).
278. See id. at 543-44.
279. 46 U.S.C. § 4306.
280. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
281. Ryan, 557 N.W.2d at 547-48.
282. Id. at 548-49, (quoting Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 922 F. Supp. 613, 615
(S.D. Ga. 1996)); see also id. at 549, n.24 (collecting authority).
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Reaching the opposite conclusion, the Missouri Court of Appeals in Ard v. Jensen28 3 was persuaded that the FBSA savings
clause was properly considered in pari materia with legislative
history indicating a legislative purpose that state statutes and
common law continue to provide a floor for appropriate safety
measures, or, in the court's words, "the common law [should] be
the minimum standard to be built upon by the Secretary's regulations."28 4 In finding no preemption of an injured skier's suit,
the Missouri appellate court found particularly telling the language of the accompanying Senate Report that "[t]he purpose of
the [savings clause] is to assure that in a product liability suit
mere compliance by a manufacturer with the minimum standards promulgated under the Act will not be a complete defense
'28 5
to liability.
ii.

Consumer Product Safety Act

In Moe v. MTD Products, Inc.28 6 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit ruled that the Consumer Product Safety Act
(CPSA) 28 7 preempted a state common law damages claim. 288
The court examined the preemptive effect of the CPSA's lawn
mower safety standard, 28 9 which requires (1) that each power
lawn mower have a blade control system that stops the blade
rotation within three seconds after the operator's hands leave
the handle; and (2) that each mower contain a label warning
"DANGER, KEEP HANDS and FEET AWAY' and showing a
blade cutting into the forefinger of a hand. Plaintiff injured his
hand when reaching into his mower's side chute to remove some
grass, and his hand came into contact with the blade, which had
unexpectedly begun to turn.
283. 996 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (A suit was brought against the boat
operaor and its manufacturer when a waterskier suffered injuries when the boat
backed over him as he prepared to ski.).
284. Id. at 599.
285. Id. at 594 (citing S. REP. No. 92-248 (1971), reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1352, stating "This section is a Committee Amendment and is
intended to clarify that compliance with the Act or standards, regulations, or orders promulgated thereunder does not relieve any person from liability at common
law or under State law." Id.)
286. 73 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1995).
287. See 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (West 1997).
288. See id. at 181. See Moe, 73 F.3d at 181.
289. See 16 CFR § 1205.5(a) (current through September 29th, 2000).
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The CPSA preemption clause provides:
Whenever a consumer product safety standard under this chapter
is in effect and applies to a risk of injury associated with a consumer product, no State or political subdivision of a State shall
have any authority either to establish or to continue in effect any
provision of a safety standard or regulation which prescribes any
requirements as to the performance, composition, design, finish,
construction, packaging, or labeling of such product which are designed to deal with the same risk of injury associated with such
consumer product, unless such requirements are identical with
290
the requirements of the Federal standard.
The Act's "savings clause" reads: "Compliance with consumer product safety rules or other rules or orders under this
Act shall not relieve any person from liability at common law or
under state statutory law to any other person." 291 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs warning
292
claim was preempted, but that the design claim was not.
iii.

Federal Hazardous Substances Act

The majority of courts considering the matter have concluded that compliance with Federal Hazardous Substances Act
("FHSA")293 labeling regulations preempt state common law
claims premised upon a party's argument that the manufacturer should have provided better hazard warnings. 294 The legislative history of the FHSA announced that its purpose was to
"provide nationally uniform requirements for adequate cautionary labeling on packages of hazardous substances which are
290. 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (West 1997).
291. 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (West 1997).
292. See Moe, 73 F.3d at 183.
293. See 15 U.S.C. § 1261 et. seq (West 1997).
294. See Salazar v. Whink Products, Co., 881 P.2d 431 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994);
see also Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397, 407-08 (Ill. 1996) (failure to
warn claim only available in instances of noncompliance with federal labeling requirements; to extent plaintiff urges that manufacturer should have a different
label, claim preempted by FHSA); Kirstein v. W.M. Barr & Co., 983 F. Supp. 753,
760-61 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (to same effect regarding warnings claim pertaining to adhesive remover); Comeaux v. National Tea Co., 81 F.3d 42 (5th Cir. 1996) (to same
effect, lighter fluid) (authority collected at Gurrieri v. William Zinsser & Co., Prod.
Liab. Rep. (CCH) 15,516 (N.J.Super.Ct. 1999) (paint primer).
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sold in interstate commerce and are intended or suitable for
household use." 295 The Act's preemption clause reads:
[Ihf a hazardous substance or its packaging is subject to a cautionary labeling requirement... [under this title] designed to protect
against a risk of illness or injury associated with the subject, no
State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue
in effect a cautionary labeling requirement applicable to such substance or packaging and designed to protect against the same risk
of illness or injury unless such cautionary labeling requirement is
identical to the labeling requirement [imposed pursuant to this
titlel .296

Gurrieriv. William Zinsser & Co. 297 was a personal injury suit
arising from the injurious inhalation of and contact exposure to
a stain remover. 298 The plaintiff claimed that the label on the
defendant's product, which contained about 2% methyl alcohol,
should have had more vigorous language or hazard signage,
such as a skull and crossbones, that would be mandated had the
product contained more than 4% methyl alcohol. 299 The court
found that the product's label complied with the warning label
standard set pursuant to the FHSA,30 0 and, affirming judgment
for the defendant, wrote:
[To the extent that the plaintiff proposes additional, different, or
more clearly-stated warnings, [these claims are preempted by the
FHSA].301... In the present case, both [the statute and the regulations] address the labeling of hazardous or dangerous substances. .

.

. A finding that specific local warnings pursuant to

state law must apply to products containing less than 4% of
methyl alcohol would create system of possibly fifty or more different labeling requirements throughout the country, contrary to
Congress' obvious intent in passing the FHSA to 'provide nation295. H.R. REP. No. 86-1861(1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N 2833.
296. 15 U.S.C.A § 1261(b)(1)(A) (West 1997).
297. 728 A.2d 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
298. See id. at 833.
299. See id. at 841.
300. See 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p) (West 1997); but see, 16 C.F.R. § 1500.14(b)(4)
(current through September 29th, 2000) (imposing different labeling requirement
for household products containing 4% or more ethyl alcohol).
301. Gurrieri,728 A.2d at 841 (citing Salazar v. Whink Products Co., 881 P.2d
431 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)).
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ally uniform requirements for adequate cautionary labeling.' 30 2
3 °3
We reject this result.
In State ex rel. Jones Chemicals, Inc. v. Seier,30 4 a Missouri appeals court found similarly that the FHSA statutory language
pertaining to product labeling preempted a plaintiffs products
liability claim under state law and that the labeling of a
container of muriatic (hydrochloric) acid contained inadequate
notice of the product's risks.305 In reaching this conclusion, the
Missouri court found that the FHSA reflected congressional intent to establish uniform nationwide standards for labeling of
hazardous substances, and to avoid the "impracticality of having states produce potentially fifty different labels for a particu'30 6
lar hazardous substance.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.30 7 ended the long reign of
judicial deference to state common law liability and regulatory
obligations, and intimated that the existence of an express preemption provision might, standing alone, suffice to permit a
finding of federal preemption. In so doing, the Court stifled the
effect of equivalently specific savings clauses that purported to
preserve state products liability or regulatory actions from federal suffocation.
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,308 the Court refined
its Cipollone analysis, and in so doing gave breathing room to
extant and future savings clauses in federal safety-related statutes. The Geier court expanded little in suggesting a means for
lower courts to proceed with confidence in reconciling express
preemption provisions with similarly explicit savings clauses.
The result of the Court's recalcitrance will surely be played out
in the decisions of lower courts which are now left to decide if
savings and preemption clauses may be interpreted in a comple302. Id. at 841 (quoting H.R.REP. No. 86-1861 at 1 (1960), reprinted in 1960
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833.)
303. Id. at 841.
304. 871 S.W.2d 611 (Mo.App. 1994).
305. See id. at 614.
306. Id. at 612-13, quoting Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993).
307. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
308. __ U.S. __
120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000).
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mentary way. The inevitable consequence of the Supreme
Court's failure to harmonize Cipollone and Geier will be a
bumper crop of conflicting decisions brought about by the inability of courts to determine in a consistent way whether the
polar magnetic field of express preemption clauses, or that of
savings clauses, is the stronger.
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